Construction Litigation and City Zoning Restrictions News in California

For my second discussion in this series about recent cases dealing with real estate law in California decided by the California Court of Appeal I wanted to mention these two decisions from the Fourth District, Division Three, and Fifth District in California—one involving construction litigation and the other involving city zoning restrictions.

YOU SPOT ZONE IT, YOU BUY IT.  Here the City of San Clemente imposed an RVL, (residential, very low land restriction), on undeveloped property, which limited parcels to one dwelling per 20 acres.  At trial, the court determined the city engaged in spot zoning and issued a writ of mandate, giving the City the choice of either complying with the writ, or paying damages for the value of the property taken by the RVL restrictions.  The appellate court affirmed, stating the City’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.  Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente  (Cal. App. Fourth Dist., Div. 3;  December 14, 2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1256.

MUST FOLLOW CONTRACTUAL ALTERNATIVE TO RIGHT TO REPAIR ACT.  Plaintiffs, owners of 32 homes built by a developer, brought a construction defect action.  Civil Code sections 895 through 945.5, the Right to Repair Act, prescribe non-adversarial pre-litigation procedures a homeowner must initiate prior to bringing a civil action against a builder for alleged construction deficiencies.  Plaintiffs contended the developer did not give the required notice under section 912.  The trial court ordered plaintiffs to observe certain contractual procedures.  The appellate court denied the plaintiff’s writ, finding the developer’s failure to comply with section 912 did not bar enforcement of its alternative contractual non-adversarial procedures.  Baeza v. Superior Court (Castle & Cooke California, Inc.) (Cal. App. Fifth Dist.;  December 14, 2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1214.

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California Real Estate Law News

Recently, at the conclusion of last year, 2011, California courts issued a number of important rulings in the area of real estate litigation.  Let me briefly mention the first two here and next week I will provide a synopsis of the other two worthy of your consideration.  The first two I want to profile for you here deal with default judgments in quiet title actions and the improper granting of a motion for summary judgment based upon an unconscionable loan transaction.  Citations and links have been provided for ease of reference.

AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED BEFORE ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A QUIET TITLE ACTION.  CCP §764.010 provides that in actions to quiet title, the court shall not enter judgment by default but shall in all cases require evidence of plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims of any of the defendants.  The appellate court found this obligated the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing in open court “hearing the defendant’s evidence.”  The dissent states a defendant should not be permitted to participate in the hearing.  Harbour Vista LLC v. HSBC Mortgage Services Inc.  (Cal. App. Fourth Dist., Div. 3;  December 19, 2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1496.

TRIABLE ISSUES EXIST AS TO WHETHER A FORECLOSURE SALE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE DUE TO THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF THE LOAN TRANSACTION.  An action in which a homeowner sued a lender, a loan servicer and others to set aside a trustee’s sale claiming predatory lending, the trial court granted summary judgment against the homeowner.  In reviewing the transaction, the appellate court noted the refinance was for $1.5 million with a monthly payment of $12,381.36 and the homeowner had a monthly income of $3,333.  The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment finding there was sufficient evidence of triable issues of material fact regarding alleged unconscionability of the transactionLona v. Citibank, N.A. (Cal. App. Sixth Dist.;  December 21, 2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89.

If you need help from a highly-qualified real estate lawyer in California, please contact Mark Mellor at 951.222.2100.

 

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New Real Estate Laws That Protect California Homeowners, Buyers and Tenants in 2012

Condo Rentals

Starting January 1, owners of units in a common-interest development, usually a condominium, must be allowed to rent or lease their units unless it was restricted before they took ownership. Senate Bill 150 was designed to counter new homeowner association (“HOA”) rules put in place to stem the tide of tenant-occupied properties. It does not apply to rental restrictions prior to January 1. Condo owners must provide to their HOA proof of their purchase date and contact information for their tenants. Certain changes of title, e.g. probate, spousal, parent-to-child, adding a joint tenant, and other transfers exempt from property tax reassessment, do not reset the date of ownership.

Need professional real estate law advice? Contact California real estate attorney, Mark Mellor, to get answers.

Excessive HOA Fees

Homeowners associations can only charge the actual cost to procure, prepare, reproduce and deliver HOA disclosures and governing documents when a home is being sold, according to Assembly Bill 771, which takes effect January 1. HOA’s routinely receive written requests for such documents in a real estate transaction, but, in the past few years, some HOAs have supercharged those fees and tacked on “junk” fees as well. The new law requires that HOAs give estimates of their fees up front, and it prohibits an HOA, or a third party, from tacking on other fees, fines, assessments, or nonessential documents, as a precondition of providing the HOA documents. The HOA also cannot charge extra fees for electronic delivery if the HOA maintains the information that way.

Tenant Smoking Ban

Landlords can now ban tobacco smoking in, or around, any residential property, including the outside common areas, as of January 1. Senate Bill 332 requires the new provision be in writing as part of the rental agreement or lease. For existing tenants, landlords must give written notice of a change in the terms of the tenancy, with at least 30 days’ notice, depending on the terms of the rental.

Foreclosure Sale

Senate Bill 4 requires that a notice of trustee sale, which lays out the date and location of a foreclosure auction, must provide more user­ friendly information about how to seek a postponement. The notices also must specify the risks for potential buyers of a foreclosure. The law, effective April 1, requires a bank, or their authorized agent, to provide timely information to anyone via the Internet, telephone recording, or other free services, about sale dates and postponements.

Conservation Plumbing Fixtures

Sellers must disclose to potential buyers whether their home has water-conservation plumbing fixtures. The change to the California Civil Code, effective January 1, edited the transfer disclosure statement to include a checkbox for such fixtures, Including low-flow toilets, shower heads and faucets. It also alerts home buyers about the following water-conservation requirements for single-family homes: As of January 1, 2017, homes built on or before January 1, 1994, must have water-conserving devices. Homes altered or improved on or after January 1, 2014 must include water-conserving plumbing fixtures as a condition of final permit approval.

Small Claims Jump to $10,000

Judges can now award up to $10,000 in a small claims action. Prior to January 1, the limit was S7,500 in small claims jurisdictions for a claim brought by a “natural person.” Small claims for injuries in an auto accident do not increase until 2015, and a small claims action brought by a business entity remains at $5,000, according to Senate Bill 221.

Real Estate Agent Discipline

Several laws impact real estate licensees.

  • The Department of Real Estate requires all agents or brokers to report, within 30 days, any disciplinary action taken by another state or federal agency, felony indictments or charges, and convictions of any felony or misdemeanor.
  • Real estate brokerages who conduct their own escrow activities under a DRE license must provide a written annual report to the DRE with the number of escrows and dollar volume it handled.
  • Agents and brokers who fail to pay their taxes could have their licenses suspended. The State Board of Equalization and the Franchise Tax Board will periodically release a list of the 500 largest tax delinquencies of more than $100,000, and the DRE is required to suspend or refuse to renew a state license for anyone on either list.

Several other laws took effect this week. For details about those or any other California laws, visit www.leginfo.ca.gov.

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How to Know if You Have a Sexual Harassment Claim

Recently, two Courts of Appeal in California weighed in on the issue of sexual harassment—the Fourth District, Division Three and Second Division, Division Four—both deciding differently on the issue.  With a divided court, in the Fourth District matter, (Brennan v. Townsend & O’Leary   (Cal. App. Fourth Dist., Div. 3; October 18, 2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1336) a female executive at an advertising agency, who prevailed at trial, lost on the appeal of her gender harassment claim.

In Brennan, the agency’s owner dressed as Santa at holiday parties and had women employees sit on his lap, he wore a Santa hat with “bitch” across the brow, talked with the plaintiff about her sex life using a certain hand gesture and asked her whether she “got any.”  One of the employees brought a plastic penis to the office and executives sometimes referred to women clients by a word that begins with a “c.”  One client was called “a demanding, unconstructive, counter-productive, mindless, shitty-ass bitch” in an agency email by an executive.  The same executive sent another email which called plaintiff “one big-titted mindless one.”

Plaintiff complained to her supervisor as well as the head of the agency.

The majority opinion concluded there was insufficient evidence that the harassing behavior was pervasive or severe enough to create a hostile work environment. The evidence was insufficient to show “severe” harassment based on gender because the employee was never assaulted, subjected to unwelcome physical contact or verbal abuse, threatened, propositioned, or subjected to explicit language directed at her or at anyone else in her presence. The evidence was also insufficient to show “pervasive” harassment based on gender. An e-mail referring to the employee was the only incident directed at her and was not intended to be shared publicly. The employee witnessed only three incidents of gender-based conduct involving coworkers over a span of several years. She did not present evidence that intrusive questions from her employer offended her. Other instances of sexual harassment that she discovered after she received the e-mail did not contribute to a hostile work environment because she did not have any knowledge or perception of them until she investigated. Finally, incidents of claimed retaliation were not acts of harassment based on gender.

The dissent disagreed with the majority opinion in “that the nonsexual acts of retaliation that took place could not be considered discrimination due to gender;” stating, “from the moment of her complaint, the atmosphere surrounding her job changed completely” and she became a marked woman, and that “the non-sexual acts of retaliation that took place” should be considered discrimination due to gender.  Brennan v. Townsend & O’Leary  199 Cal.App.4th at 1359-60.

In the Court of Appeal Second Division, Division Four matter, (Fuentes v. Autozone, Inc. (Cal. App. Second Dist., Div. 4; November 16, 2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1221) during a five week period, when a store manager was on leave, a 21-year-old cashier was subjected to rumors she had a sexually transmitted disease and that she and a co-worker were having a sexual relationship and suggestions she could make more money as a stripper.  In one incident, she was turned around by the assistant manager who said to her:  “Show your butt to the customers and that way you can sell more.”

In Fuentes, the Second District Court of Appeal rejected defendant, Autozone’s claim that plaintiff’s testimony was inherently improbable and found that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff’s testimony related several incidents of inappropriate behavior and comments by her supervisors. The evidence at trial established that all the incidents and comments about plaintiff, including a directive that she display her buttocks to customers to increase sales, rumors that plaintiff had sexually transmitted herpes, and profane speculation about a sexual relationship between plaintiff and a coworker, were focused on her gender.

Plaintiff was made the object of sexual humiliation and exploitation for the entertainment of managers, employees, and customers. When an acting manager was confronted by plaintiff about the herpes rumor, he threatened to fire her if she raised the issue again. While these events occurred over a compressed period of time, the court found substantial evidence that the harassment suffered by plaintiff was both pervasive and severe. The evidence established that plaintiff found the conduct of her supervisors offensive. The court concluded that a reasonable person would share that perception.

The Court of Appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the plaintiff, noting the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult.”  Fuentes v. Autozone, Inc. 200 Cal.App.4th at 1237.

Perhaps the best way to reconcile the two decisions is to first look at the pervasiveness and severity of the discriminatory behavior complained of.  First, consider the basis of the behavior and whether it is indeed “gender” based.  Also, whether the complaining person was aware (e.g. had knowledge) of the behavior at the time and was offended by it.  Finally, would a reasonable person be similarly offended by the same behavior(s).  Based upon these multiplicity of factors one can best evaluate if they have a sexual harassment claim, or if a business and/or its supervisors are being wrongfully accused of same.

Contact California business attorney, Mark Mellor if you are involved in a sexual harassment claim.

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TWO DEEDS OF TRUST; NEITHER WAS RECORDED FIRST—A PRIMER IN THE LAW OF PRIORITIES, OR CALIFORNIA’S “RACE-NOTICE” STATUTES.

Who is First In Right when two deeds of trust that secured the same real property, were simultaneously time-stamped for recording, but, indexed at different times?  In First Bank v. East West Bank   (October 17, 2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1309, the Second District Court of Appeal Division Three concluded the lenders have equal priority.

In the First Bank case, the Court reviewed undisputed evidence that outlined the procedure with most recorders across the state, which allows title insurance companies to deliver trust deeds to the recorder’s office in batches before 8:00 a.m. when the office opens. As in First Bank, trust deeds are deposited with the recorder’s office before business hours and as is the case for all documents and instruments deposited with the recorder’s office, one of the examiners reviews the title insurance companies’ trust deeds to determine whether they meet the requirements for recording.[1]

The examiner then enters the instruments into the enterprise recording archive system and sends the documents to a cashier to determine the applicable fees. The recorder stamps them with the date and time of recording. The practice of most of the recorder’s offices across the state is to give all instruments deposited before the offices open for business an 8:00 a.m. time stamp. Instruments are indexed roughly two days later.  In this case, although both deeds were time stamped at 8:00 a.m., the recorder indexed East West Bank’s trust deed at 11:26 a.m. and First Bank’s trust deed at 3:08 p.m.[2]

Because of the different indexing times, therefore, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, was faced with a quandary as to which Bank had priority under California’s recording statutes.  First Bank provides a great discussion and overview of California’s “Law of Priorities” in order to decide who has priority and when, which is worth our review.

First Bank set forth the rule as follows: California starts with a “ ‘first in time, first in right’ system of lien priorities,” under which “a conveyance recorded first generally has priority over any later-recorded conveyance.” [3]  “An instrument is deemed to be recorded when, being duly acknowledged or proved and certified, it is deposited in the Recorder’s office, with the proper officer, for record.” [4]

This “ ‘first in time[,] first in right’ ” system is modified by the recording statutes, which allow subsequent purchasers to achieve priority under the “‘Race-Notice’ theory.” [5] Thereunder, “Every grant of an estate in real property is conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under him, except a purchaser, or incumbrancer, who in good faith and for a valuable consideration acquires a title or lien by an instrument that is first duly recorded.” [6] Stating the rule differently, Civil Code section 1214 reads in relevant part, “Every conveyance of real property … is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property … in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded … .”

Under these “Race-Notice” rules, a subsequent purchaser obtains priority for a real property interest by (1) acquiring the interest as a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration with neither actual knowledge nor constructive notice of (2) a previously created interest and (3) “first duly record[ing]” the interest, i.e., recording before the previously created interest is recorded.[7]

One may then ask, what is or what makes a “bona-fide purchaser?” ‘The elements of a bona fide purchase are (1) payment of value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without actual or constructive notice of another’s rights.’” “‘The absence of notice is an essential requirement in order that one may be regarded as a bona fide purchaser.’”[8]

Due to the “notice” requirement, the Court addressed the concept of one simply having knowledge of another’s right to real property, also referred to as “Constructive Notice.” First Bank, stated, however, that Constructive notice is a legal “‘fiction.’” “Constructive notice of an interest in real property is imparted by the recording and proper indexing of an instrument in the public records.[9]  Stated otherwise, the recording of a document does not impart constructive notice; “[t]he operative event [for purposes of constructive notice] is actually the indexing of the document …”[10]

Thus, the Court found that pursuant to Civ.Code §1170, both trust deeds were deemed recorded simultaneously. The Court reasoned that both trust deeds were executed on the same day and were deemed recorded simultaneously.  As such, neither bank was a subsequent purchaser for purposes of Civ.Code §§2897, 1107, 1214. The Court reasoned that it would have disrupted the statutory scheme to make priority turn on the random act of indexing, especially where banks and title insurers had no influence over when the recorder indexes trust deeds and the procedure was simply done to accommodate the sheer volume of title documents that enter the system on a daily basis.

[1] First Bank, 199 Cal.App.4th at 1312.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Thaler v. Household Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1099, [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 779];  see, Civ.Code §2897 [“Other things being equal, different liens upon the same property have priority according to the time of their creation … .”].

[4] First Bank, 199 Cal.App.4th at 1312;  citing, Civ.Code §1170.  

[5] 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2009) §11:3, p. 11-18,19.

[6] Civ.Code §1107.

[7] First Bank, 199 Cal.App.4th at 1313;  citing, Civ.Code §§ 1107, 1213, 1214; see, 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 11:3, p. 11-20; Hochstein v. Romero (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 447, 451, [268 Cal.Rptr. 202] [bona fide purchaser who acquires interest in real property without notice of another's rights in the property, takes property free of such unknown rights].

[8] Citing, Gates Rubber Co. v. Ulman (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 356, 364, [262 Cal. Rptr. 630] (citations omitted)..

[9] Civ.Code §1213; Dyer v. Martinez (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1243–1246, [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 907]; Watkins v. Wilhoit (1894) 104 Cal. 395, 399–400, [38 P. 53]; Cady v. Purser, supra, 131 Cal. 552, 557, [63 P. 844]; Hochstein v. Romero (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 447, 452, [268 Cal.Rptr. 202]; First Fidelity Thrift & Loan Assn. v. Alliance Bank (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1433 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 295].

[10] Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1866, [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63].

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Health Care Reform—More Colloquially Known As “ObamaCare.”*

The Court granted review in three of the petitions that are currently pending before it to review the litigation over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) – also known more simply as “health care reform,” or more colloquially as “ObamaCare.”

The Supreme Court set aside a whopping five-and-a-half hours of oral argument time in March to consider a broad range of questions relating to the Act. In order to break down fact from fiction and partisan politics we will break down the cases and the issues by starting with a little bit of background first.

On March 23, 2010, the President signed the ACA – which is commonly regarded as his signature legislative achievement – into law. The ACA was intended to fundamentally change the health care industry and the way that Americans pay for their health care: among other things, the ACA makes it easier for adult children to stay on their parents’ insurance policies and imposes a variety of new taxes (including one on indoor tanning, which has already taken effect) to finance all of the changes imposed by the Act. For the Court, however, a few provisions of the Act are most relevant.

First and foremost is the so-called “individual mandate,” which goes into effect on January 1, 2014: it requires virtually all Americans to obtain health insurance, or pay a fine. The government’s ability to require everyone to buy insurance depends in part on another provision of the Act that goes into effect at the same time, which requires health insurance companies to provide affordable insurance for everyone – even people who had previously been unable to obtain insurance because they suffer from “pre-existing conditions.”

Second, the Act makes more people eligible for Medicaid, the program that provides health care to low-income Americans. Medicaid programs are administered by the states, which rely heavily (although not exclusively) on federal funding; in the Act, Congress required states to comply with all of the new Medicaid rules or risk losing all of their federal funding for the program.

As soon as the President signed the bill, Republican challengers were heading to court, seeking to have the law overturned. One of the first was Ken Cuccinelli, the attorney general of Virginia; the lawsuits that followed included ones filed by Florida and a group of twenty-five other states, Liberty University, a group of small businesses, and the Thomas More Law Center (a Christian non-profit law firm).

The first intermediate appellate court to weigh in on the Act was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which is based in Cincinnati, in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama. A divided panel of that court rejected the Center’s broad argument that the individual mandate can never be constitutional – an argument known as a “facial challenge.” In an opinion by Judge Jeffrey Sutton, a highly regarded conservative judge who once clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia, the court held that the individual challengers in the case (who had joined the Center as plaintiffs) would have to wait until the law actually went into effect in 2014 and then argue that requiring them specifically to buy insurance would be unconstitutional.

About six weeks later, the Atlanta-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, from the Sixth Circuit, in the case brought by Florida and a group of twenty-five other states, along with the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), agreeing with the challengers that the mandate is unconstitutional. The court did not go as far as the challengers would have liked, however: it held that even if the individual mandate was unconstitutional, the rest of the ACA could still go into effect – a legal concept known as “severability” (or, in this case, the lack thereof). And to the challengers’ further disappointment, the court also found no problem in the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid eligibility.

In early September, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, based in Virginia, held that neither of the two cases before it could continue. In Liberty University v. Geithner, two judges appointed by Democratic presidents threw out the case on a ground that the Obama Administration had disavowed: the fine that the Act levies on people who don’t buy health insurance is a tax, which – because of a federal law known as the Anti-Injunction Act – the individuals in the case cannot challenge until they are actually forced to pay it, in 2014 or later. And Virginia v. Sebelius, the court explained, should be dismissed on the rationale that the only plaintiff in the case – the Commonwealth of Virginia – had no legal right to bring a lawsuit because the individual mandate affects only individuals.

This set the stage for numerous petitions for review to the Supreme Court.  A few days before the Court was set to consider five of those petitions, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit added to the suspense surrounding the litigation when it too upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate. As in the Sixth Circuit, the decision was as significant for its author Senior Judge Laurence H. Silberman, a well-respected Reagan appointee with impeccable conservative credentials. Although another conservative judge, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, dissented, he did so on the ground that – as the Fourth Circuit had held in the Liberty University case – the Anti-Injunction Act barred the lawsuit at this point in time.

Now the Court has announced that it will decide four questions relating to the health care litigation. First, the Court will review the Anti-Injunction Act question: whether the challenges to the individual mandate can be in court at all right now. The Court’s decision to consider this issue illustrates its broad power to set its own agenda: e.g. – the challengers want the Court to invalidate the Act now, while the government wants the Court to uphold the law now.

Second, if the Court determines that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the lawsuits challenging the individual mandate, it will consider whether the individual mandate is in fact constitutional. This issue boils down to whether Congress has the power to enact a law requiring everyone in the United States to buy health insurance, or pay a penalty. The Obama Administration argues that it does, under a provision of the Constitution – known as the Commerce Clause – that authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” The government’s primary argument is based on the idea that an individual’s decision not to buy health insurance affects interstate commerce because that person will inevitably wind up needing medical care, for which he will be unable to pay; the costs will be absorbed by health care providers, who will then pass at least some of them on to the insurance companies, who in turn pass them on to the people who do buy insurance. The challengers take a very different view: they characterize the individual mandate as an unprecedented effort by Congress to regulate inactivity (in the form of the refusal to buy health insurance). If Congress can require everyone in the United States to buy insurance, they argue, there would be virtually no limits to what Congress can rely on the Commerce Clause to do.

Third, the Court agreed to review the issue of “severability” – whether the rest of the Act can remain in effect even if the individual mandate is unconstitutional. This could be an issue of enormous practical significance for the health insurance industry, which the Act requires to provide insurance at reasonable prices to everyone, including people who either could not get insurance at all or could only do so at very high rates because they had pre-existing medical conditions. This expanded coverage is only economically feasible, the argument goes, if everyone is required to buy insurance, which would allow the additional costs from providing insurance to less healthy people to be offset by the additional insurance premiums from the (presumably) healthier people who – without the individual mandate – would not buy insurance at all.

The final question that will be before the Court – whether the Act’s expansion of the Medicaid program violates the Constitution – has largely flown under the radar screen so far, including because even the Eleventh Circuit agreed that it did not. This is an issue that is near and dear to supporters of states’ rights, who argue that in cases like this one Congress oversteps its authority when it uses the threat of taking away all federal funding for Medicaid as a stick to get the states to do something that it otherwise couldn’t do, such as expand eligibility for Medicaid in all of the states. Defenders of the Medicaid expansion provision argue, by contrast, that states can decide whether they want to participate in Medicaid on the terms outlined in the Act; if they decline to do so, they have plenty of time to come up with an alternative plan.

Two final notes about the health care litigation. First, although there had been pressure from groups on both ends of the ideological spectrum for Justices Thomas (due to his wife’s activities in groups opposing the Act) and Kagan (based on her role as the Solicitor General in the Obama Administration at the time the bill was enacted) to recuse themselves from considering any challenges to the Act, the fact that both Justices apparently voted on whether to grant certiorari shows that both are going to participate fully in the cases. But just as there is no reason to expect that either Justice will recuse him- or herself from the litigation, there is also no reason to expect the drumbeat of recusal calls to subside; if anything, the calls are likely to increase as the March argument draws closer.

Second, this case would be an historic one in any year, as the Court will now be weighing in on fundamental questions regarding the division of authority between states and the federal government. But this is not just any year. Instead, the Court will be issuing its decision on the constitutionality of a sitting president’s principal legislative achievement just a few months before voters go to the polls in a hotly contested re-election campaign. And although the Act’s constitutionality isn’t likely to replace the economy as the primary focus of that re-election campaign, the Court’s decision – however it rules – is likely to cause the public to focus on the Court in a way that it hasn’t in nearly twelve years, when the Rehnquist Court issued its decision in Bush v. Gore.


*The content for this article was adapted from Amy Howe, The health care grants: In Plain English, SCOTUSblog (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/the-health-care-grants-in-plain-english/

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Riverside Family Law Attorney – New Website

Whether you need a Divorce Attorney in Riverside or Child Custody Lawyer in San Bernardino, the Mellor Law Firm has attorneys that have a combined 40 plus years of experience to help you get the results you searching for.

With the development of their new Riverside Law Firm website, the Mellor Law Firm has also launched a new Family Law section for visitors to study about the following areas of practice:

  • Divorce
  • Child Support
  • Child Custody & Visitation
  • Property Division
  • Community & Separate Property

For more information on The Mellor Law Firm, visit www.mellorlawfirm.com or 951-222-2100 to schedule a consultation.

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Law Against Short Sale Deficiencies Expanded

In a major victory for Homeowners facing the loss of their homes, Governor Brown signed into law today, Senate Bill 458, prohibiting a deficiency after a short sale for one-to-four residential units, regardless of whether the lender is a senior, or junior lienholder.  Effective immediately for transactions closing escrow from this day forward, both senior and junior lienholders cannot require a borrower to owe, or pay for any deficiency in a short sale. This law also prohibits any deficiency judgment to be requested, or rendered for senior, or junior liens after a short sale of one-to-four residential units.  Any purported waiver of this rule shall be void and against public policy.

Although a lender cannot require a borrower to pay any additional compensation in exchange for a short sale approval, the new law does not prohibit a borrower from voluntarily offering a monetary contribution to a lender in hopes of obtaining a short sale.  A lender is also permitted under the new law to negotiate for a contribution from someone other than the borrower, such as other lenders, agents, relatives, and the like.

Exceptions to the new law include a lender seeking damages for a borrower’s fraud or waste; a borrower that is a corporation, LLC, limited partnership, or political subdivision of the state; a lien secured by a bond as specified; a public utility lien; and additional rules apply if a note is cross-collateralized by more than one property.

This law is fully set forth as Senate Bill 458 (Corbett) at www.leginfo.ca.gov.

For more information on the foreclosure process and California real estate law visit MellowLawFirm.com.

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California Real Estate Law – New Homebuyer Tax Credit

In an effort to stimulate the economy, California is offering first-time homebuyers up to $10,000 in state tax credits. Two different types of homebuyer credit are available: credits for first-time homebuyers and credits for homebuyers opting for new homes. The credits are alternative credits, such that a homebuyer qualifying for both must choose one or the other.

Gov. Schwarzenegger hopes the program will “get people off the fence and into homes,” Mercury News reported.

With a 12.5-percent unemployment rate, the fifth highest in the nation, California plans to spend up to $100 million on the homebuyer tax credit programs. These programs operate on a first-come, first-serve basis, and give homebuyers 5 percent credit on the purchase price of a home, up to a $10,000 maximum. A similar program last year made homebuyer tax credits available to more than 10,000 Californians.

To be eligible for the new credit, applicants must close escrow on or after May 1, 2010. It may take up to six months to be notified by the California Franchise Tax Board whether a tax credit is available, and any credit must be applied in three equal annual installments.

California Tax Credit for New Home Buyers

The California tax credit for new home buyers is intended primarily to encourage jobs in the construction industry.

The new home tax credit applies only to purchased single-family homes that have not been occupied previously. The taxpayer receiving the credit must be eligible for the homeowner’s exemption and must live in the home for two years immediately after purchase.

For the new home tax credit, taxpayers may make reservations indicating their intention to apply for a credit upon entering into an enforceable contract after May 1. The reservation expires two weeks after closing.

California First-Time Home Buyer Tax Credit

The conditions underlying the first-time homebuyer credit are identical to the conditions for the new home buyer credit, but for the requirement that the home must never been occupied.

Taxpayers may not reserve tax credits under the first-time homebuyer program.

According to the California Franchise Tax Board, taxpayers had already applied for $2.3 million of the $100 million allocated to the homebuyer tax credits by May 4. Those interested in the program would be wise to act quickly, to avoid missing out on the tax incentives.

New Tax Law Assists Californians With Cancelled Debts

The relief a debtor feels upon a creditor forgiving or canceling a portion of a debt often gives way to frustration when the tax man comes knocking. For taxation purposes, forgiven debt constitutes income subject to taxation unless there is a statutory directive to the contrary.

Three years ago, Congress opted to give homeowners who have become unable to pay their mortgages a break. Under the Mortgage Debt Relief Act of 2007, taxpayers who had their debt reduced through mortgage restructuring or debt forgiven in connection with foreclosure do not have to include the forgiven debt as income for federal tax purposes.

However, federal taxes are only one component of the overall tax burden; homeowners must also pay state taxes, which are governed by state laws. Recently homeowners in California have not been granted similar relief under state tax laws.

California law aligned with federal law on this matter in 2007 and 2008, but the protections had lapsed. Accordingly, since 2009, California homeowners have been required to treat any forgiven debts as income when calculating state taxes.

Fortunately, California lawmakers have now addressed this burden, once again. Under SB 401, signed into law in April, California law aligns with the federal Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007. The new law is effective for tax years 2009 to 2012, retroactively providing relief for those who become unable to pay their mortgages in 2009 and early 2010.

Under the new law, Californians with qualifying short sales of their homes will not be required to pay state income tax on the forgiven debt. The legislation also excludes from state taxation any loan forgiveness associated with home loan modifications or foreclosure.

Many of the homeowners affected by the new law have already lost their homes due to the floundering economy. Requiring homeowners to pay tax on a debt forgiven because they were without means to pay the original debt seems unnecessarily harsh.

Although a tax break is unlikely to compensate for the loss of a home, it does help to ensure that those facing financial difficulties will be able to return to solid financial ground more quickly.

For more information on real estate law in california, please click california real estate law.

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Save Your House – With The Housing Market In Shambles, Who Will Pay?

Although the real estate market began its collapse several years ago, banks and lenders continue to sort out the related issues today. According to the New York Times, during the real estate boom years banks nationwide lent homeowners more than approximately a trillion dollars in the form of home equity loans. These loans were secured solely by the value of homes, which once seemed to increase without bound.

As home values rapidly declined, though, so did the ability and willingness of these homeowners to repay their home equity loans. The American Bankers Association reports that the delinquency rates on home equity loans are higher than those of all other consumer loans, including credit cards and car loans.

Lenders want to blame the borrowers for taking on debts beyond their means. Borrowers insist that lenders are also to blame, as they extended credit to individuals and businesses well in excess of reason, even using predatory lending practices at times. Whereas home equity lines of credit were once only available to those with the strongest credit history, lenders pushed to expand the availability of these loans under the assumption that the growing real estate market would support the risk.

Arguably, there is plenty of blame to go around. Almost everyone involved in the real estate market trusted that the housing market would continue to expand, with little concern that the values might eventually decline. Now that the market has collapsed, however, lenders and borrowers are left arguing over who will be held accountable. More important than the question of who will accept the blame is the question of who will accept the consequences.

Thus far, it seems that the consequences will be shared. Lenders are writing off their losses at unprecedented rates — the New York Times reports that in the first quarter of this year, lenders wrote off $7.88 billion in home equity loans and home equity lines of credit. However, borrowers are also not getting off consequence-free. Borrowers who default on home-equity loans will notice the effects in their credit ratings for a long time to come. These defaults may also have debt relief tax consequences.

It is important to note, though, that this is not the end of the crisis for the California housing market. Unfortunately, the worst is yet to come. A new wave of foreclosures will arrive in the near future, as option adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) reset and borrowers find their monthly payments drastically increasing.

According to Business Week, when option ARMs reset, the monthly  mortgage payment typically increases 65 percent or more. As many homeowners are already struggling to meet monthly mortgage payments, a rise of this magnitude will likely force many to enter foreclosure.

For those facing foreclosure or struggling to meet monthly mortgage payments, there may be options. Speak with a knowledgeable attorney to discuss your circumstances and to Save Your House from foreclosure.

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